Abstract. In response to the near collapse of US securitization markets in 2008, the Federal Reserve created the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, which offered non-recourse loans to finance investors' purchases of certain highly rated asset-backed securities. We study the effects of this program and find that it lowered interest rate spreads for some categories of asset-backed securities but had little impact on the pricing of individual securities. These findings suggest that the program improved conditions in securitization markets but did not subsidize individual securities. We also find that the risk of loss to the US government was small.
Introduction
Prior to the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] , investors in highly rated securities backed by business and consumer loans typically relied on short-term funding markets, such as the repurchase and asset-backed commercial paper markets, to finance their investments. However, beginning in the summer of 2007, creditors pulled back from short-term funding markets in what Brunnermeier (2009) and Gorton (2010) characterize as a run on the shadow banking system.
With less funding, and amid more general concerns about ratings on structured products and the economic consequences of the financial crisis, secondary markets for asset-backed securities became less liquid and primary markets for such securities nearly shut down. As an illustration, spreads over swap rates on the triple-A rated tranches of securities backed by auto loans reached nearly 600 basis points by late 2008, as compared to only a few basis points prior to the crisis, and issuance of securities backed by auto loans dwindled to near zero (see Figure 1 ).
The near collapse of securitization markets in late 2008 raised concerns about consumers' access to credit and household consumption, as about half of credit card loans and a third of auto loans had been funded through securitization in the years leading up to the crisis.
2 Indeed, the average interest rate on auto loans extended by finance companies-which are heavily dependent on securitization-rose from 3.25 percent in July 2008 to over 8 percent by December 2008. We address the question of TALF's effectiveness by studying the market-and securitylevel effects of the program using a standard event-study methodology (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997) . Our event studies examine the change in the spreads on various types of asset-backed securities relative to changes in broader market indexes in the few days or one week surrounding a public announcement about the TALF program. The identification assumptions are that the market-and security-level announcements were a surprise to market participants, and that in the absence of any TALF announcements, ABS spreads during each event window would be unchanged relative to broad market indexes.
In the market-level analysis, we estimate the effect of nine major, public announcements about the program on the market-level pricing for highly rated consumer ABS as well as commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS). As is standard, the analysis controls for broader movements in other asset prices, and is conducted separately for different categories of asset backed securities. We also compare auto ABS spreads in U.S. securitization markets (relative to broader market pricing in the U.S.) to auto ABS spreads in Europe (relative to broader market pricing in Europe). European ABS markets also came under pressure in 2007, but the ECB provided funding for ABS in a manner much different from the TALF.
In the security-level analysis, we estimate the effect of a determination by the Federal
Reserve at nine TALF subscriptions that a specific legacy CMBS did or did not qualify for TALF financing. The analysis examines the change in the yield spread of the CMBS, relative to the changes in the spreads on all CMBS broadly eligible for TALF funding, around the announcement about whether the particular security would be accepted or rejected by the program. If TALF subsidized or certified securities, we would expect the spreads on accepted or rejected securities to experience an outsized change, relative to the spreads of other securities, after this announcement.
In terms of results, we find that announcements about the program's development substantially affected the market-level pricing of highly rated auto ABS and CMBS. This result is fairly consistent across the nine major TALF announcement dates, which strengthens the case that we are identifying the effect of the program. However, we find less evidence that the acceptance or rejection of specific securities from TALF had an impact on the pricing of those securities-moreover, the effects, when found, are small. These results suggest that TALF may have calmed investors about ABS markets as a whole, improving market liquidity and market functioning, but may not have provided substantial subsidies or certification benefits to individual securities.
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We offer, however, the following caveats to our results. First, many events occurred during our sample period that substantively affected financial markets, such as the bankruptcy filings of General Motors and Chrysler. These events occurred outside our event windows, but evolving investor expectations about the likelihood of such policies or events could confound our results. Second, our results will not capture the full effect of TALF on the ABS markets if we 7 The possibility that a TALF-like program could have both market-and security-level effects is demonstrated in the theoretical model in Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2010) .
have not identified all TALF-related announcements that the market deemed significant. We believe that we have included all salient announcements, but we cannot fully discern what pieces of information are considered important by financial markets. Finally, our security-level results are based solely on secondary market trading of CMBS and thus may not fully apply to the new issue TALF program, in part since the new issue program launched at an earlier date.
In this paper, we also consider the primary potential cost of the program, the risk of loss to the U.S. government. Importantly, the structural features of the program substantially limited this risk. In addition, data on legacy CMBS securities suggest that, among those CMBS that were "TALF-eligible" according to the program's terms and conditions, the program screened out, i.e. rejected, the riskiest securities. However, the program did appear to attract somewhat riskier than average TALF-eligible securities, which is not surprising given the non-recourse nature of the TALF loans. Nevertheless, on balance, the risk controls of the program appear to have worked. To date, a large volume of TALF loans have been fully repaid ahead of schedule, none have defaulted, and all loans outstanding remain well collateralized.
This paper contributes to the recent literature on the effect of Federal Reserve liquidity facilities on financial markets. Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2010) Willen (2010) compare funds with a relatively high share of securities that were eligible for funding in the AMLF to other funds, and they find that the facility significantly stemmed outflows from the funds with a high share of AMLF-eligible securities.
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the role of securitization in the broader economy. In Section 3, we describe the market-and security-level data used in our empirical analyses. We then present our market-level event studies in Section 4, beginning with a timeline of announcements related to the TALF program. In Section 5, we turn to the security-level analysis of the program's decision to accept individual legacy CMBS securities for funding. We evaluate the costs of the program to the U.S. government in Section 6, followed by a brief conclusion in Section 7.
Securitization and the Broader Economy
In the years leading up to the financial crisis, securitization became an important method for funding loans to households and businesses. Securitization involves the pooling of loans or other receivables and then the funding of the pool with debt securities. The securities are typically issued in tranches, with the highly rated (i.e., low risk) tranches having higher priority and accounting for the majority of the claims on a pool. In addition, the issuer of a securitization usually retains some risk that the loans in the pool are not all repaid. In 2006-the year of peak issuance-gross issuance of asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities totaled nearly $2.4 trillion. 9 Furthermore, securitization funded an estimated half of credit card loans and a third of auto loans in the years preceding the crisis.
Securitization may have benefits and costs for the broader economy. In terms of benefits, securitization has the potential to lower the cost of credit to businesses and households by reducing financial institutions' funding costs. Securitization might be expected to reduce funding costs because it can produce securities that cater to the risk-return preferences of investors. In addition, by providing access to low-cost long-term funding, securitization may help finance companies compete with banks, and such competition could in turn lower the cost of credit to businesses and households. Johnson, Pence, and Vine (2010) TALF was created to increase the availability of credit to households and businesses by restoring liquidity, at least temporarily, to securitization markets.
Data
The data used in our empirical analysis come from a variety of sources. For our marketlevel analysis of consumer ABS markets, we rely on weekly dealer indicative quotes from the We also control for changes in broad financial market spreads with indicative quotes on the CDX index of investment-grade corporate credit default swaps from Markit. By using this measure, we are able to isolate idiosyncratic factors specific to the ABS market. We use the 5-year CDX, which is the most liquid contract (Markit, 2010 
Market-Level Event Studies

Market Events
The market-level analysis exploits several major announcements about the existence, details, and operation of the TALF program. The announcements are listed chronologically in Table 1 along with an indication of whether the information in the announcement pertained to the TALF program for consumer ABS or the TALF program for CMBS. 11 We chose the announcements that provided substantial new information about the program and thus had the potential to affect consumer ABS or CMBS markets.
The first two TALF-related announcements had the potential to affect consumer ABS markets, but seemed unlikely to affect CMBS markets given that the possibility of funding announcement by Standard and Poor's that it was likely to modify its rating methodology for CMBS in a manner that would cut roughly in half the pool of legacy CMBS securities eligible for funding in the TALF program.
Market Analysis of Spreads
We preview the results of our market-level consumer ABS analysis in Figure 2 , which plots indicative quotes on spreads to swaps for triple-A two-year auto ABS issued in the U.S. and
European markets. As a control for market-wide developments, we plot the 5-year CDX Series 9 described earlier in the paper.
Starting first with the U.S. market, spreads on auto ABS (the solid line) continued to climb even after the announcement of TALF and spiked at over 500 basis points in late December 2008. Spreads were largely in line with the CDX (the dashed line) through September, suggesting that ABS spreads over that period were driven largely by market-wide factors.
However, ABS spreads subsequently soared far above the CDX.
Subsequently, however, spreads began to decline sharply, reaching around 300 basis points at the end of the first quarter of 2009. At the same time, the CDX index rose amid worries that the government would not be able to avert the collapse and takeover of several major financial institutions. The fact that ABS spreads fell at a time when the market-wide price of risk and the level of risk appeared to rise provides circumstantial evidence that market participants thought that TALF might be successful in providing liquidity to the market.
To analyze the change in spreads more formally, we conduct a standard event study of the effect on spreads of the five TALF announcements that are relevant for the consumer ABS market. We examine spreads on ABS collateralized by auto loans, credit card loans, government-guaranteed student loans, and private student loans. 13 These types of ABS were the original consumer TALF-eligible asset classes. The estimation period is from September 20, 2007 , to September 20, 2010 . We have earlier data but its inclusion would likely bias our results in favor of finding an effect, given the lower volatility of spread changes prior to the financial crisis.
Our performance measure for asset class j is the change in spread levels, computed as
As our spread data are weekly, is the spread on the first day of the week that spans the announcement, and is the spread seven days later. Likewise, and correspond to the spread on the CDX at the beginning and end of the same one-week period. The timing of the announcements varies, so some announcements are near the beginning of the relevant one-week period whereas others are near the end.
To estimate (1), we regress ∆ on dummy variables for the five announcements with the potential to affect the consumer ABS market, where each dummy is equal to 1 on the week that spans the announcement, and zero on all other weeks. As a result, the coefficient on each dummy can be interpreted as the change in the ABS spread relative to the market-wide spread in week t.
The results from the market event studies of consumer ABS, presented in Table 2 , parallel the findings from Figure 2 . Spreads on consumer ABS continued to widen sharply relative to the CDX during the week in which TALF was first announced; market participants may have been more focused on the widespread dislocations in financial markets at that time.
However, in early March, spreads on auto and student loan ABS fell by more than the equivalent changes in the CDX. In particular, the point estimate for the March 3 announcement that the first TALF subscription would occur is about -63 basis points for auto loans and -38 basis points for government-guaranteed student loans, and both estimates are statistically significant.
Similarly, the March 19 announcement of the successful completion of the first subscription is associated with a 40 basis point decrease in spreads on auto ABS, and is just shy of statistical significance at the 10 percent level. Changes in spreads on credit card or private student loan ABS, however, are not significant for any announcement.
The fact that our results are strongest for auto ABS may stem in part from the fact that TALF targeted the new issue market and our data are from the secondary market. For autos, the legacy ABS trading on the secondary market were fairly similar to the new issue ABS eligible for TALF. Although auto loan delinquencies rose during the financial crisis, the credit performance of auto ABS pools was largely in line with analyst expectations, and the newly issued TALF-eligible ABS were reasonably comparable in credit quality and structure to the securities traded on the secondary market. In contrast, for the other three consumer ABS asset classes, either the underlying loans or the ABS structure performed more poorly than expected during the financial crisis. 14 Secondary market spreads may reflect these asset-specific factors as well as any overall improvement in liquidity.
Another piece of evidence that suggests that TALF had an effect on securitization markets comes from comparing securitization markets in the U.S. to those in Europe. Returning spreads. The different trajectories in U.S. and European markets do not appear to result from differences in market-wide factors, as credit default swap spreads on investment-grade corporate bonds followed the same path in both markets (iTRAXX not shown).
Instead, the policy infrastructures in the United States and Europe may account for the difference. ABS are accepted as collateral for both Eurosystem refinancing operations and Federal Reserve discount window loans. However, the Eurosystem accepts ABS issued by pledging institutions as long as the ABS meets a "true sale" criteria. The Federal Reserve does not accept ABS issued by the pledging institution.
As the financial crisis intensified, ABS issuance remained robust, and even increased, in
Europe. However, originators switched to a "structure to repo" model in which they used the ABS as repo collateral with the Eurosystem immediately after issuance. In 2008, ABS
represented 28 percent of all collateral posted at the Eurosystem, up from 6 percent in 2004, and almost all the ABS were pledged by the originating institution. Although the Eurosystem framework preserved ABS issuance, it came at the cost of a lack of private investor involvement in the market. This lack of investor involvement-in contrast to the TALF program-hindered the price discovery process and likely contributed to the divergence in spreads in the U.S. and
Europe.
To formally compare U.S. and European ABS markets, a second layer of differencing is added to the performance measure. The resulting measure is
where j in this case is only for the auto segment of the ABS market, as we were unable to obtain yield spread data for European credit card ABS and student loans are an unknown asset class in Europe. Just as the CDX is used to control for broad market movements in credit spreads in the U.S., we use the spread on the iTRAXX to control for broad movements in European credit spreads.
This event study suggests that spreads on U.S. auto ABS fell by about 50 basis points more than spreads on European auto ABS, controlling for the price of overall credit risk in both markets, in the weeks spanning the March 3 and March 19 announcements. The changes are statistically significant, and the magnitudes of the coefficients are comparable to the earlier auto ABS event study. In contrast, the earlier announcements about the existence and terms of the program, as in the earlier event study, did not have a significant effect on spreads.
The market-level analysis provides evidence that TALF improved the liquidity of the auto ABS market. However, the results for other segments of the consumer ABS market are not that strong. Beyond the idiosyncratic features mentioned above, the weakness of the results may be partly due to the light secondary market trading activity. Many traditional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, tend to buy and hold these securities. As a result, dealer indicative quotes for consumer ABS are only provided on a weekly basis, and even these weekly quotes are often constant for a couple weeks in a row. In addition, our first two announcements span the Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays, respectively-periods when trading is particularly light. In contrast, trading in the CMBS market is considerably more active.
We next explore the effect of TALF announcements on spreads in the CMBS market. As shown in Figure 3 We use the seven announcements listed in Table 1 CDX that corresponds most closely to each CMBS measure. 16 We then regress ∆ onto dummy variables for the seven announcements listed in Table 1 as having the potential to affect the CMBS market, where each dummy variable is set equal to 1 for the four-day period beginning the day before an announcement, and equal to zero on all other days. As a result, the coefficient on each dummy can be interpreted as the four-day spread change between t-2 and t+2.
The results, presented in Table 3 , provide fairly strong evidence that TALF benefited CMBS markets, though as in the consumer study the announcements closer to the actual first The fact that these markets are more liquid than the consumer markets may partly explain why we find a stronger effect in this market.
15 This measure implicitly assumes a beta of 1 on the market index. A regression of on over the pre-crisis period from September 21, 2007 to September 1, 2008 confirms this assumption. 16 We pair each CMBX with the equivalent CDX vintage. For example, the CMBX3, which corresponds to CMBS originated in the first half of 2007, is paired with the CDX that references bonds that were investment grade in the first half of 2007. We pair the 10-year CMBS spreads with its closest analogue, which is the CDX corresponding to the second half of 2007. 17 As the May 26 S&P announcement halved the share of legacy CMBS that were potentially TALF-eligible, we expect a positive coefficient on this announcement. 18 As an additional robustness test, we look at changes in indicative quotes on 5-year CMBS around these announcement dates. These data are only available weekly because 5-year CMBS are not traded as actively as 10-year CMBS. These results (not shown in the paper) indicate statistically significant changes in spreads on three announcement dates.
Security-Level Event Studies
Our security-level studies are based on the legacy CMBS TALF program, which provides a unique setting to assess the effect of TALF on security performance. Under this program, securities issued before 2009 were eligible collateral for loans, and thus price data are available both before and after the subscription date. (In contrast, securities in the new issue program were generally issued concurrently with the subscription date.) Legacy CMBS were accepted as collateral for TALF loans in nine subscriptions, one per month, between July 2009 and March 2010. Some broad parameters that established the types of eligible CMBS were made public to investors. For example, all legacy CMBS posted as collateral had to be senior in payment priority to all other interests in the underlying pool of commercial mortgages and had to have at least two triple-A ratings (the top rating for the agency) and no ratings below triple-A. In addition, all securities pledged as collateral for TALF loans were further scrutinized by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and could be rejected as loan collateral in the event that it was determined that the security posed unacceptable risk.
Over the nine subscriptions that accepted legacy CMBS as collateral, 267 distinct securities were accepted as collateral and 44 were rejected. Importantly for our analysis, the acceptance and rejection decisions were announced on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's website about a week after each subscription; these announcements are the dates used in our security-level event study analysis.
As before, we examine the effect of a legacy CMBS security being accepted or rejected from TALF on security performance using an event-study methodology. We examine the effect of the acceptance and rejection decision on spread levels, controlling for market wide developments with the spread on an index of triple-A rated CMBS. Specifically, we use an equally-weighted average of spreads on roughly 1,300 CMBS securities that were putatively TALF eligible pending a final credit review. 19 Finally, we only examine the effect of the first instance of acceptance or rejection into or out of the TALF program. A number of securities were accepted or rejected by the program on multiple subscriptions. 20 The information content of a second or third acceptance or rejection after the first is likely small and so we omit these observations from the event study.
Security-level effects from being accepted or rejected by TALF might be expected for several reasons. First, if the haircuts on TALF loans were too small, then TALF acceptance could, in effect, provide a credit subsidy to the security being funded. In addition, to the extent that TALF provides funding and liquidity for certain CMBS securities and not others, acceptance into TALF could signal that a specific security is now "good for TALF." Other investors interested in purchasing CMBS might well focus on those securities for which financing, through future TALF subscriptions, could likely be obtained. Accordingly, liquidity might be expected to improve most for those securities that were accepted for TALF. Also, TALF acceptance could also provide a more general certification effect. Each CMBS security that was accepted as collateral for a TALF loan passed a stringent risk analysis that was designed to exclude securities that were risky relative to others in the senior most triple-A rated set. Acceptance into the TALF may have indicated that a particular CMBS security was a "true" triple-A and may have resulted in increased investor demand.
Security-Level Analysis of Spreads
19 Results using a proprietary index of AAA CMBS spreads are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those that employ the equally-weighted average of TALF eligible securities. 20 A large number of securities were accepted multiple times by the TALF program. Only three securities were rejected at more than one subscription.
Our security-level performance measure is the change in spread levels, computed as a cross-sectional analogue of (1). Specifically,
where represents the change in spread level on security from days before the announcement date (ad) that the security was accepted or rejected to days after ad.
Additionally, represents the corresponding change in the equally-weighted TALF-eligible CMBS index over the same period. We then regress ∆ onto dummy variables for each of the nine separate subscription announcements, July 2009 through March 2010. We also regress ∆ on a constant to test for an average effect across all subscriptions. We estimate the regression on accepted and rejected securities separately. Finally, we examine event windows, 2 , ranging between two and ten days.
We look first at securities that were accepted as collateral for TALF loans (table 4) . At three of the nine subscriptions, the spreads on the accepted securities fell by a statistically significant 7 to 15 basis points more than the spreads on all putatively eligible CMBS for the two-day event window. Spreads also fell by a statistically significant amount over wider event windows. In particular, in the case of the eight-day event window, spreads fell significantly by between 3 and 19 basis points. However, for some other subscription dates and event windows, the point estimates indicate a statistically significant spread widening.
Averaging across all subscriptions, spreads narrowed on TALF-accepted securities by a statistically insignificant 1 basis point and 0 basis points for the two-and six-day windows, and by a statistically significant 5 basis points for the eight-day window. The remaining point estimates are all positive, implying a relative spread widening over wider event windows, but are statistically insignificant though the result for the ten-day event window is marginal. Taken together, these results suggest that TALF did not provide much of a certification or subsidization benefit, if any, to accepted securities. Given that investors likely presumed that securities would be accepted, though, this result may not be surprising.
We turn next to the securities that were rejected as TALF collateral (table 5) . We begin by noting that the number of rejected securities (44) is much smaller than the number of accepted securities (267). The pooled results in the final row of the table indicate that at all horizons, securities rejected from TALF experienced a spread widening relative to the rest of the CMBS market. The point estimates range from 3 to 7 basis points for event windows between two and six days, and from 17 to 20 basis points for wider event windows. The estimated spread widening is statistically significant for the two-day, eight-day, and ten-day event windows.
Across individual subscriptions, the point estimates are generally positive, if often insignificant.
In contrast to the results for accepted securities, these findings suggest that TALF had a modest certification or subsidization effect for those securities that were rejected from the program. The stronger results for rejected than aceepted securities may not be surprising inasmuch as investors likely did not anticipate rejection from the program.
Risk of Loss to the U.S. Government
The TALF was designed so that risk of loss to the government-the Treasury as well as the Federal Reserve-was extremely low. 21 As mentioned in the introduction, TALF loans were non-recourse, meaning that the borrower could walk away from the loan and surrender the collateral in lieu of repayment. If this were to happen, the borrower would lose its initial investment, which was determined by the "haircut"-the difference between the security's value 21 Ashcraft, Malz, and Pozsar (2011) provide a comprehensive discussion of the risk controls of the TALF program.
and the loan amount. In other words, the loan included a put option on the ABS security with a strike price equal to the amount of the loan. The most likely situation in which the put would be exercised would be if the TALF loan came due and the value of the collateral had fallen below the amount owed. In most situations, the borrower would not surrender the collateral before the loan came due because the interest and principal payments on the collateral would continue to exceed the interest and principal on the loan even if the collateral were impaired (i.e., the investment would have positive carry).
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In either case, in the event that collateral was surrendered in lieu of repayment, the residual value of the collateral would offset some of the loss on the loan. The TALF was designed so that even in stressed economic conditions, those net credit costs would, in aggregate, be offset several times over by the accumulated excess interest (roughly the TALF loan rate less the rate charged banks at the Federal Reserve's discount window) earned on the loans. 
Risk Controls
22 Of course, at some level of impairment the carry on the securities would not cover the interest expense on the loan but the impairment rate required for this to occur would be extraordinarily high for securities accepted by the TALF.
There were several layers of risk control built into the TALF program. First, TALF loans were only extended to finance purchases of securities acquired in arms-length transactions-the investor had to be unaffiliated with the originator or seller and there could be no side-payments between the investor and seller. As a result, since the TALF loans only covered part of the purchase price (as described below), the borrower always had money at risk if the collateral declined in value.
Second, the securities were required to have triple-A ratings from two or more rating agencies and could not have a rating below triple-A from any agency. For CMBS, those ratings had to be from one of five credit rating agencies that had been qualified to provide ratings for the TALF, and the collateral was subject to an additional credit review by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York before being accepted. For ABS, initially credit ratings were accepted based on ratings from the three largest rating agencies and there was no separate credit review. Starting in the third quarter of 2009, however, criteria for credit rating agencies for ABS were established that resulted in an additional agency's ratings being accepted (for a total of four TALF-eligible rating agencies for ABS), and an additional credit review process was established for ABS.
Third, the maximum amount of each TALF loan equaled the market value of the pledged collateral less a haircut that depended on the riskiness of the collateral. The haircuts were calibrated based on the historical price volatility and credit loss experience of the eligible securities. The haircuts varied from 5 percent for securities with short maturities and strong track records such as credit card ABS up to 18 percent for longer-dated securities with higher historical loss experiences and more volatile prices such as CMBS.
And fourth, the TALF loan interest rates were set at spreads chosen to be well above those that prevailed in more normal financial conditions, although below those at the height of the crisis. TALF loan rates were set as a spread over a variable base rate-usually Libor-for loans secured by variable-rate collateral and over a fixed base rate-the Libor swap spread-for loans backed by fixed-rate collateral. The spreads for TALF loans that were backed by government-guaranteed collateral (SBA ABS and FFELP student loan ABS) were 50 basis points. For other TALF loans, the spreads were 100 basis points. The elevated interest rates helped reduce the risk of the program by serving as a buffer against losses and by providing borrowers an incentive to repay the loans when financial conditions normalized.
CMBS Screening
We use our database of legacy CMBS securities to better understand the TALF screening process along two dimensions. The first is a comparison of the yields on CMBS that were rejected from the program to the yields on CMBS that were accepted. A second perspective is a comparison of the deals that were accepted in the program to the universe of deals that met the broad eligibility requirements for the program (although the deals might not have passed the credit review). Under the terms and conditions of the TALF program, about 1,300 securities (relative to a universe of approximately 11,000 outstanding legacy CMBS) met the broad eligibility requirements for the program. Figure 4 shows both perspectives by plotting from January 2009 to June 2010 the difference in average yield spreads for securities that were accepted and rejected for funding by TALF to the respective average for securities that were putatively TALF eligible.
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The plot suggests that high-spread and relatively risky legacy CMBS were screened out of the program, but that accepted securities were somewhat riskier than the pool of CMBS that met the broad eligibility requirements. 24 Specifically, yields on legacy CMBS accepted by TALF were consistently about 100 basis points lower than those on legacy CMBS rejected by While the relative spread levels presented in Figure 4 provide some evidence that those securities brought to the TALF for funding were somewhat riskier, spread levels may not only reflect risk. In particular, during this period many market participants would have argued that spread levels were driven by irrational fears rather than rational assessments of risk.
Accordingly, we also examine a standard and more direct measure of risk: the volatility of yield spread changes. Specifically, we compare differences in yield spread volatility between those securities that were and were not brought to the TALF for funding. This comparison complements the spread level analysis in Figure 4 and allows for a more direct assessment of 24 One possibility for the larger spread on securities brought for TALF funding is that these securities tend to have longer maturities due to the 3 and 5 year tenor of the TALF loans. If credit spreads exhibit an upward sloping term structure then this could account for the difference in spread on securities brought for TALF funding and other securities. In unreported calculations we have performed regressions that control for the maturity (duration) of securities that were and were not brought to the TALF. Even after controlling for duration we still find a significantly higher spread on securities brought to the TALF for funding. whether higher risk securities, i.e. those with more volatile spreads, were more likely to be brought to the TALF for funding by investors.
A plot of the relative (ratio) volatility of yield spreads (standard deviation of daily spread changes) for securities that were and were not brought to the TALF for funding is presented in Figure 5 . Either the standard deviation of spread changes or the standard deviation of proportional spread changes (changes in log spreads) can be used to measure spread volatility, and we show both in the figure. In both cases, we plot the ratio of the equally weighted average of the three-month rolling standard deviation of spread (log spread) changes for those triple-A CMBS securities that were and were not offered as collateral for a TALF loan. A value of this ratio above unity indicates that the representative CMBS security brought to the TALF for funding exhibits higher yield spread volatility than the typical CMBS security that met the minimum TALF eligibility requirements but was never offered as collateral for a TALF loan.
The relative volatilities plotted in Figure 5 suggest that those CMBS securities brought for TALF funding typically exhibited higher spread volatility. In the case of the relative volatility measure based on proportional (log) spread changes, the volatility of those securities brought for TALF funding is actually lower than those securities not offered as TALF collateral from April through June of 2009, but this relationship reverses thereafter for the remainder of the sample period. The measure based on spread changes always indicates that securities brought for TALF funding were riskier than those that were not. Looking at both measures over the entire sample period indicates that securities that were offered as TALF collateral exhibited spread volatility that was typically between 10 and 20 percent higher than those securities not offered as TALF collateral. Accordingly, an analysis of both spread levels and spread volatilities provide some evidence that investors chose to offer somewhat riskier and less liquid CMBS securities as collateral for TALF loans. Both relative volatility measures also indicate that the differential in risk and liquidity between securities that were and were not brought to the TALF for funding has narrowed significantly.
Loss experience
The improvement in financial markets in 2009 not only makes it difficult to assess the benefits of the TALF, it also makes it difficult to assess the ex ante costs. It is not possible to know what the loss experience would have been if financial market conditions had deteriorated sharply further after the program began. Nevertheless, the experience to date suggests that the risks were indeed low. Over two thousand TALF loans were made for about $70 billion in total.
As of the beginning of October 2010, although no loans had yet come due, 1200 loans-totaling Notes: In each column we report the results of regressing the difference in the CMBS spread change and the change in the spread on the CDX index over the two-day window from day t-2 to t+2 onto a set of dummy variables for each announcement date. The CMBX1, CMBX2, …, CMBX5 denote indexes based on credit default swaps (CDS) written on baskets of triple-A-rated commercial mortgage backed securities ( Coefficients of the anticipated sign that are statistically significant at the 10 percent level are in bold. We report t-statistics in parenthesis underneath the point estimate. Notes: Above we present the event study results that estimate the average change in security-level spreads before and after each TALF subscription. We present results for symmetric event windows between two and ten days. We report t-statistics in parentheses and results that are significant at the 10% level with the anticipated sign are highlighted in bold. Notes: Above we present the event study results that estimate the average change in security-level spreads before and after each TALF subscription. We present results for symmetric event windows between two and ten days. We report t-statistics in parentheses and results that are significant at the 10% level with the anticipated sign are highlighted in bold. Notes: This figure plots the average difference in yield spread between CMBS securities that were offered as collateral for a TALF loan and the yield spread on a index of triple-A CMBS bonds. In the figure we plot this difference for CMBS securities that were accepted and rejected by the by the program separately. The figure also presents three vertical lines to mark the date at which (1) newly issued CMBS were announced as being added as TALF eligible collateral (5/1/09), (2) legacy CMBS were announced as being added as TALF eligible collateral (5/19/09) and (3) the first legacy CMBS subscription (7/22/09). 
Figure 5 Relative Spread Volatility of CMBS Securities Offered and Not Offered as TALF Loan Collateral
Notes: This figure plots the ratio of the equally-weighted average of three-month rolling standard deviations of yield spreads on CMBS securities that were offered as collateral for TALF loans and the equally weighted average of three-month rolling standard deviations of yield spreads on CMBS securities that were not offered as TALF collateral but were putatively eligible for the TALF. The dashed line is calculated using the volatility of spread changes. The solid line is calculated using proportion (log) spread changes. The spread data used for the securities is from Trepp. We also show, using a solid vertical line, three key dates: the date at which the addition of CMBS to the TALF was announced, the date at which the addition of Legacy CMBS to the TALF was announced and the date of the first Legacy CMBS subscription. 
